



INTEGRATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTO LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: GLOBAL TRENDS AND UZBEKISTAN'S READINESS

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Abstract. The legal profession is being reshaped by artificial intelligence faster than law schools are willing to admit. This article examines how institutions in the United States and European Union are responding and sets their experience against the situation of Uzbekistan. Drawing on a documentary and comparative legal analysis of publicly available curricula, national legislation, and peer-reviewed scholarship, it asks a direct question: are Uzbekistan's law faculties preparing graduates for a profession that has already changed? The answer is a qualified no. Uzbekistan has built an ambitious national framework, and the new Digital Law programme at Tashkent State University of Law, established by Presidential Decree No. PF-232 of November 2025, shows that reform is beginning. But dedicated technology content is still absent from the general curriculum, faculty capacity is thin, and coordination across the responsible ministries is weak. The article identifies three structural gaps, proposes a concrete model curriculum for an AI for Lawyers course, and sets out a phased pilot implementation model designed for Uzbek conditions, with practical recommendations for educators, administrators, and policymakers.

Keywords: legal education; artificial intelligence; law school curriculum; Uzbekistan higher education; legal technology; AI strategy; curriculum reform

I. Introduction

Let me start with something that is not in dispute. GPT-4, the large language model developed by OpenAI, passed the bar examination in 2023 - not barely, but in the top percentile of test-takers [2]. Legal research tools powered by similar technology are now standard equipment at major law firms, and according to data published by the American Bar Association, the share of North American law firms using artificial intelligence tools jumped from 19 percent in 2023 to 79 percent in 2024 [1]. These are not projections about a distant future. They describe the environment into which today's law students are already graduating.

And yet most law schools - in Uzbekistan and in many other countries - are still largely teaching the way they always have. Doctrinal instruction, case analysis, and moot court remain the foundations of legal training, as they have for decades. There is nothing wrong with those foundations. The problem is that they are no longer sufficient on their own, and the pace at which the profession is adopting artificial intelligence has begun to outrun the pace at which legal education is adapting to it. As Richard Susskind has argued across successive editions of his work on the future of the profession, the lawyers who will do well are the ones who understand the technologies reshaping their work - not the ones who hope to outlast them [10].

This gap matters differently in different places. In the United States, where more than half of law schools now offer specialized artificial intelligence courses, the adjustment is uncomfortable but underway. In Uzbekistan, the situation is more complicated - not because of institutional indifference, but because of the specific stage of reform the country is at. Uzbekistan has launched one of the most ambitious artificial



intelligence policy agendas in Central Asia [9]. Yet the connection between those national ambitions and what happens inside law faculty classrooms remains, for the most part, still to be made.

That gap is what this article addresses. Not artificial intelligence in the abstract, and not legal education reform in general, but the specific question of whether Uzbekistan's law schools are preparing their graduates for a profession that has already changed and is continuing to change. The short answer is: not yet - though, as the most recent developments show, the picture is beginning to shift. The article proceeds as follows. Part II explains how the study was done. Part III surveys global trends, focusing on the United States and Europe. Part IV examines the pedagogical models that have emerged. Part V turns to Uzbekistan - its national policy framework and the actual curricula of its law faculties. Part VI sets out three structural gaps. Part VII proposes a concrete model curriculum and a way to pilot it. Part VIII offers practical recommendations for the groups whose action reform depends on. Part IX concludes.

II. How This Study Was Done

A word on method is necessary, because it defines what this article can and cannot claim. This is a documentary and comparative legal study. It does not rest on original interviews or student surveys; it rests on the analysis of material that is already public, and its conclusions reach exactly as far as that material allows - no further.

Three kinds of sources do the work. The first is legal and policy texts: the Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Technologies until 2030 [9], Presidential Decree No. PF-232 of November 2025 on Tashkent State University of Law [6], and, for comparison, the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act [4]. The second is institutional documentation - most importantly the published curricular structure of Uzbekistan's leading law faculties, read alongside comparable material from selected institutions in the United States and Europe. [11] The third is peer-reviewed scholarship on artificial intelligence and legal education, including studies indexed in Scopus and Web of Science [3,5,7].

The comparative parts follow what comparative lawyers call the functional method: instead of comparing rules for their own sake, the study looks at how different systems answer the same practical problem - how to prepare lawyers for a technology-transformed profession - and asks which answers might travel. One limitation should be stated plainly rather than buried. Reading published curricula tells you what courses a faculty formally offers; it does not tell you what a particular professor does with artificial intelligence inside an existing course, nor what students actually experience. A fuller account would need survey and interview work with faculty and students. That is a real next step, and this article points toward it without pretending to have done it.

III. The Global Shift: What Law Schools Are Actually Doing

A. The United States: Speed and Unevenness

American law schools have moved faster on artificial intelligence than most of their international counterparts, and the reason is not mysterious. American law firms



moved fast, and law schools operate in a competitive market where the employability of graduates is a primary reputational concern. The pressure has been real and, on balance, productive.

Suffolk University Law School was among the first institutions to make artificial intelligence instruction mandatory for all first-year students. Dean Andrew Perlman, who sits on the American Bar Association's Task Force on Law and Artificial Intelligence, has been blunt about why: employers increasingly expect graduates who can work with these tools, and the schools that fail to produce them will lose standing [8]. It is hard to argue with the logic, and a growing number of schools have stopped trying to.

At the leading research universities, the ambition runs further still. Yale Law School has been building artificial intelligence tools for its legal clinics for nearly a decade and now offers coursework in which students construct systems capable of legal reasoning tasks rather than merely using what already exists. The University of Chicago Law School has set up a laboratory where students develop legal technology products under the supervision of faculty and practitioners. Stanford Law School's CodeX Center for Legal Informatics has, for more than a decade, been turning out research and graduates at the intersection of law and computer science - well before generative artificial intelligence made the subject fashionable. The content of these programmes runs across a spectrum: at the basic level, learning to use artificial intelligence-powered research platforms and to judge their output critically; at a more demanding level, the ethics of the technology - algorithmic bias, confidentiality risk on cloud platforms, professional responsibility; and at the frontier, understanding how large language models actually work, including where and why they fabricate [1].

None of this means the American picture is uniformly positive. Academic integrity concerns have become sharp. Faculty resistance to curriculum change is, as everywhere, real. And there is a persistent risk that artificial intelligence "integration" becomes a single workshop bolted onto an otherwise unchanged programme - a label rather than a reform. The best programmes have avoided that trap. Plenty have not.

B. Europe: Reform at Different Speeds

European legal education presents a more varied picture. The diversity of national legal traditions, the more cautious pace of curricular reform in civil law systems, and a different set of market pressures all combine to produce a slower - though still genuine - shift.

A 2025 scoping review in *The Law Teacher* pulled together 82 separate studies on artificial intelligence in legal education [5]. Its most striking finding was not about what institutions are doing but about what students are doing without waiting for them: in the United Kingdom, more than half of students reported using artificial intelligence tools in assessments by early 2024. The distance between student adoption and institutional response is wide, and it is generating pedagogical problems that faculties are still scrambling to address.



Within the European Union, the Artificial Intelligence Act - in force since 2024 - has itself become a reason to change the curriculum [4]. Making sense of the Act requires lawyers who can hold a legal and a technical thought at the same time: how is a system classified by risk level, what conformity assessment obligations follow, who is liable when an artificial intelligence system causes harm. Scholarship on the digital transformation of legal education in Europe has been clear-eyed about both sides of this - the opportunity and the risk - and insistent on one point in particular: technology has to be integrated for sound pedagogical reasons, not simply because it is available [3].

IV. What Good Integration Actually Looks Like

Across the institutions worth studying, four distinct pedagogical models have emerged. They are not mutually exclusive, and the strongest programmes tend to combine several.

The *embedded model* folds artificial intelligence tools and questions into existing courses rather than building new ones - a contracts course with a unit on artificial intelligence-assisted drafting, a legal research course that sets the new tools against the traditional ones. It is the easiest model to adopt because it asks for no new course slots and no wholesale change in faculty expertise. Its weakness is depth: it can raise awareness, but it rarely builds real competence.

The *dedicated course model* creates a standalone course - increasingly a requirement rather than an elective — on artificial intelligence in legal practice, or on the law that governs artificial intelligence, or both. It buys the depth the embedded model cannot, but it depends on having faculty who can actually teach at the law-technology intersection.

The *laboratory model* is the most demanding and the most transformative. Here students build or rigorously test artificial intelligence systems rather than simply using commercial products [7]. Graduates come out understanding the technology well enough to advise a client about it with genuine comprehension rather than borrowed confidence. It is resource-intensive, but for institutions that can manage it, the results justify the cost.

The *interdisciplinary model* pairs law faculties with computer science, engineering, or business programmes. This one matters especially for Uzbekistan, where several universities already house legal and technical education under a single roof - which means structured cross-departmental teaching is not a distant aspiration but something that could be organized now.

What separates the programmes that genuinely work from the ones that only look the part, across all four models, is a stubborn emphasis on critical engagement. The aim is not to produce lawyers who are enthusiastic about artificial intelligence. It is to produce lawyers who know when to use it, when not to, and why - who will read an artificially generated brief with exactly the scrutiny they would give a junior colleague's first draft.



V. Uzbekistan: Ambition at the Top, Gaps in the Classroom

A. What the National Framework Commits To

It is worth being specific about Uzbekistan's national commitments, because they are more substantial than many observers outside the country assume. Presidential Resolution No. PP-358 of October 14, 2024 approved the Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Technologies until 2030, and the Strategy is not vague: it sets measurable targets, including artificial intelligence research laboratories in higher education institutions and the inclusion of artificial intelligence subjects in higher education curricula from the 2026/2027 academic year [9]. Scholarship on artificial intelligence governance in Central Asia has placed Uzbekistan's framework within the wider regional effort to build legal and ethical structures for emerging technology - crediting the ambition while noting the implementation difficulties that transition economies routinely face [14].

That this is more than paper is confirmed from outside. The United Nations E-Government Survey 2024 documented measurable progress in Uzbekistan's digital governance [12], which tells us the national digitalization agenda is producing results rather than merely declarations. That is the backdrop against which legal education reform has to be judged.

B. What the Law Faculties Are Actually Teaching

Legal education in Uzbekistan runs mainly through Tashkent State University of Law (TSUL), the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, the Academy of Law Enforcement, and law faculties inside several broader universities. TSUL is the natural place to look closely, both because it is the country's leading law faculty and because it tends to set the benchmark the rest of the system follows [11].

Read its published core modules - constitutional law, administrative law, civil law, criminal law, labour law, environmental law, civil and criminal procedure, financial law, criminology, tax law, international law, commercial law, land law, the methodology of legal research, legal writing - and a clear picture emerges. The curriculum is comprehensive in the traditional doctrinal sense. It is also, in its standard form, without a dedicated course in artificial intelligence or legal technology at the bachelor's level [11]. This is not a failing unique to Uzbekistan; the same gap runs through much of the civil law world. But it is an honest description of the starting point.

And yet the picture cannot be left there, because recent developments genuinely change it. TSUL has established a Legal Tech laboratory and a research centre devoted to legal technologies and systems - institutional engagement with the field at the level of research. [11] More consequential still, Presidential Decree No. PF-232 of November 26, 2025 formally tasked TSUL with creating an international Digital Law educational programme, with admissions for the 2026/2027 cohort opening in June 2026 [6,13]. The same decree did something broader: from the 2026/2027 academic year it mandates a pilot of clinical and dual practical training, under which a substantial



share of instruction for second-, third-, and fourth-year students moves into courts, law enforcement bodies, and other legal organizations - and it introduces an artificial intelligence-based system for assessing the quality of teaching [13].

These are real steps, and they deserve to be recognized as such. They show the gap between national policy and faculty-level reform beginning to close at the country's leading institution. But two qualifications matter. The first: the Digital Law programme is a specialized track, not a reform of the general curriculum - most Uzbek law students, including those at TSUL who are not in the new programme and the great majority at other faculties, will still follow a curriculum with no dedicated artificial intelligence content. The second: TSUL is the best-resourced law faculty in the country and is operating under direct presidential attention. What happens there is not automatically a guide to what happens elsewhere. The reform problem, in other words, is as much about breadth as about depth.

Regional research reinforces the point. A 2025 study in the Qubahan Academic Journal built and piloted a pedagogical model for integrating digital competencies - artificial intelligence-assisted legal research, legal informatics, data ethics - into legal education across institutions in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, using a mixed-methods design of surveys, focus groups, and classroom observation [7]. That study does two useful things at once: it confirms that the integration gap is real and recognized across the region, and it shows that structured pedagogical responses to it are already being designed and tested. It gives Uzbek curricular reform an evidence base to build on rather than a blank page.

VI. Three Gaps That Have to Close

Mapping Uzbekistan's ambitions against what is actually happening in its law faculties brings three structural gaps into focus.

Gap one is curriculum content. Outside the specialized Digital Law track, the general curriculum at Uzbek law faculties does not yet connect artificial intelligence to the concrete work of lawyering: how to evaluate an artificially generated legal memorandum, what professional responsibility requires when a cloud-based tool processes client data, how to advise a client on compliance with Uzbekistan's emerging artificial intelligence legislation. Building that curriculum takes subject-matter expertise that, at present, mostly sits outside the law faculties [1].

Gap two is faculty capacity. Curriculum follows faculty - always. A community of Uzbek legal educators with genuine expertise at the law-technology intersection exists, but it is small and concentrated in a handful of institutions. Closing this gap takes deliberate investment: professional development in artificial intelligence aimed at legal academics, visiting-faculty arrangements, and research support for the scholars willing to work in this area. The regional and European scholarship cited in this article is itself part of the material that faculty development can draw on [3,7].

Gap three is institutional coordination. Uzbekistan's artificial intelligence strategy is led by the Ministry of Digital Technologies, higher education policy by the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Innovation, and legal education pulls in the



Ministry of Justice as well, since TSUL answers to it. The risk in that arrangement is familiar: the artificial intelligence-in-higher-education mandate gets implemented in a way that satisfies the letter of the policy without meeting the specific needs of legal education. Someone has to own the law-specific question. Right now, no one clearly does [9].

VII. A Model Course - and a Realistic Way to Pilot It

Criticism is easy; a usable proposal is harder, and more useful. This part sets out a concrete structure for a one-semester course - call it *Artificial Intelligence for Lawyers* - designed for Uzbek conditions, and then a realistic way to introduce it.

A. The “AI for Lawyers” Course

The course is built as a 3-credit, 15-week module for third- or fourth-year bachelor's students, and it falls into four blocks.

Block one - Foundations (weeks 1–3). What artificial intelligence and large language models actually are, at a conceptual level; what they can and cannot do; the particular problem of fabricated output; and the shape of the artificial intelligence landscape in legal practice. No technical prerequisites - the goal here is informed literacy, not engineering.

Block two - Artificial Intelligence in Legal Practice (weeks 4–8). Artificial intelligence-assisted legal research and how to evaluate it critically; document review and contract analysis tools; hands-on exercises in testing the reliability of artificially generated legal text; and a steady focus on the line between what the tool can do and what professional judgment still has to do.

Block three - The Law Governing Artificial Intelligence (weeks 9–12). Uzbekistan's artificial intelligence legislation and the 2030 Strategy framework; the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act as a comparative reference point; data protection and confidentiality; liability for artificial intelligence-related harm; algorithmic bias and the non-discrimination problem.

Block four - Ethics and Professional Responsibility (weeks 13–15). The professional conduct obligations that come with using these tools; client confidentiality and the cloud; the lawyer's duty of competence in a profession that technology is actively reshaping; and a closing applied assessment in which each student evaluates an artificially generated legal work product and writes up their professional reasoning.

Assessment runs through continuous practical exercises and that final applied task rather than a single written examination - which fits the competency-based aim of the course, and, not incidentally, sidesteps much of the academic integrity problem that conventional written assignments now face in an artificial intelligence era.

B. A Phased Pilot

The worst way to introduce this course would be a single system-wide mandate. A phased approach is both safer and more likely to work.

Phase one - pilot, one academic year. Offer the course as an elective at one or two leading faculties. TSUL is the obvious candidate, given its Legal Tech laboratory and the Digital Law programme infrastructure already in place. Collect student outcome



and feedback data systematically from the start. The credit-modular system already operating in Uzbek universities gives the structural room to do this without disruption.

Phase two - refine and expand, years two and three. Evaluate the pilot honestly, revise the curriculum in light of what the evidence shows, and extend the course to additional faculties as an elective - paired with a faculty development programme so that teaching capacity grows beyond the original pilot institution rather than staying trapped there.

Phase three - mainstream, year four onward. If the evaluation supports it, move the core elements of the course into the standard curriculum and begin embedding artificial intelligence components into existing doctrinal courses. The goal at this stage is breadth across the whole system - not depth at a single flagship institution.

This sequence is deliberately built to run alongside the dual and clinical training reform already mandated for TSUL from 2026/2027, and alongside the national timeline for artificial intelligence in higher education. Legal education reform, on this model, moves in step with the institutional changes already under way rather than against them [6,13].

VIII. Practical Recommendations

The model course and phased pilot set out above are the heart of what this article proposes. But reform of this kind depends on four groups acting, and it is worth being specific about what each of them can usefully do.

For law school administrators. Start with what already exists rather than waiting for a complete reform plan. The credit-modular system gives you the structural room to introduce the “AI for Lawyers” elective described in Part VII without disrupting the existing curriculum, and to do so first as a pilot. Legal research methodology and commercial law are the natural courses in which to begin embedding artificial intelligence content immediately, ahead of the dedicated course. Document what works, then build outward from it.

For faculty. You do not need to become an artificial intelligence engineer to teach this material well. What is needed is engagement with the scholarship - the peer-reviewed work cited in this article is a starting point - and enough technical literacy to understand the tools your students are already using. Treating artificial intelligence literacy as a professional development priority rather than an optional interest is the right posture, because the profession your graduates are entering has already taken that step [3,7].

For policymakers. Translate the 2026/2027 artificial intelligence mandate into specific curricular guidance for law faculties rather than leaving it as a general instruction. Work with the Ministry of Justice and legal professional bodies to define the competencies Uzbek lawyers will actually need, and assign clear responsibility for the law-specific question - which, as Part VI argued, currently belongs to no one.



Dedicated funding for legal technology curriculum development, separate from general artificial intelligence education funding, would reflect the reality that legal education's needs are particular [6,9].

For students. Do not wait for the curriculum to catch up. The international resources for building artificial intelligence literacy in a legal context are extensive and largely free, and the students who arrive at their first jobs already fluent in these tools will have a real and visible advantage over those who do not. That advantage is available now, to anyone willing to pursue it [10].

IX. Conclusion

Uzbekistan has built an ambitious and credible national framework for artificial intelligence in education, and the most recent developments - above all the Digital Law programme created at Tashkent State University of Law by Presidential Decree No. PF-232 - show that the framework is starting to turn into concrete reform at the leading law faculty [6,9]. That progress is real, and it should be said plainly.

But the documentary analysis in this article shows, just as plainly, that the general legal curriculum across the system still has no dedicated artificial intelligence content, that faculty capacity remains thin and concentrated, and that no single body clearly owns the coordination problem. The challenge is one of breadth - reaching past a single specialized programme at a single institution - at least as much as it is one of depth.

The model course and the phased pilot proposed here are offered as a concrete contribution to closing that gap. They are designed to be realistic in Uzbek conditions: they build on the credit-modular system that already exists, they run alongside the dual-training reform already mandated, and they move through evaluated pilot stages instead of betting everything on an untested system-wide change. The foundations - the policy mandate, the institutional infrastructure, a developing regional research base - are in place. What remains is the patient, evidence-based work of extending artificial intelligence competence across the whole of legal education, so that every Uzbek law graduate, and not only those who happen to enter a specialized programme, walks into the profession actually prepared for it [7,10].

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